3 Toward a More Deontological Approach to the Ethical Use of Social Influence

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From the very earliest days of the field, social psychologists have actively studied social influence processes (e.g., Sherif, 1936). Social psychologists consider the empirical study of social influence processes to be a core competence for the field (see Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Indeed, social influence processes are arguably the very core of social psychology. Social psychologists have not been dispassionate observers of the social influence process, however. They have chosen specific influence processes to study as they emerge from societal trends (cf. Steiner, 1986), and they have regularly commented on the ethical and social implications of their research findings (e.g., Janis, 1982; Milgram, 1974). The first purpose of this chapter is to call attention to the ethical underpinnings of a number of the classic works in social psychology. Specifically, I discuss important early milestones in research on the ethical implications of the use of social influence by powerful people, the origins of this research in ethical concerns of the day, and the continuing effect those studies have on how social psychologists frame their research. This review is not intended to be a comprehensive look at the social influence literature (see Cialdini & Trost, 1998, for a comprehensive review). Rather, it is a reminder that interests in social influence and ethics have a long and intertwined history in social psychology.

The second purpose of this chapter is to argue for a new direction in research on the ethics of social influence. I argue that a dominant theme in this literature is the suggestion that the most ethical use of social influence is not to exercise direct social influence at all. Group leaders should be impartial (e.g., Janis, 1982), legal authorities should be neutral (e.g., Tyler & Lind, 1992), and those who give direct orders should never go beyond normative boundaries (e.g., Milgram, 1974). I maintain that these recommendations do not solve the ethical dilemmas associated with the exercise of social influence; they simply pass them elsewhere. Influential people can have enormous impact on others through indirect means (e.g., deciding who will be empowered to make a decision rather than accepting group membership as given and trying to influence the members directly). In fact, a number of scholars recently have drawn attention to indirect and procedural uses of influence in authority relations and the ethical issues associated with that practice (e.g., Belliveau, 1995; Hoyt & Garrison, 1997; Peterson, 1997; Tyler, this volume). I conclude by arguing that the study of ethics and social influence should be expanded to consider the ethics of such indirect social influence attempts.

HOW SOCIAL INFLUENCE AND ETHICS ARE INTERTWINED IN CLASSIC SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Ethics and the Use of Group Membership Pressure

The power of group membership to alter attitudes and behaviors is documented in a number of classic studies beginning with Sherif's (1936) work on the autokinetic effect (i.e., judging the distance a stationary spot of light appears to move in an otherwise dark room). Sherif became interested in this problem in part as a result of the great debates taking place both inside and outside of academe at the time about the role of culture and the evolution of social norms. He was very interested in how people's opinions and attitudes could be manipulated through group process. His research was the first to convincingly document that people look to others for information about the correctness of their attitudes. Beyond documenting social comparison behaviors, however, one of the most significant findings from Sherif's studies was that an extreme and confident individual could have a disproportionate effect on others' attitudes under conditions of uncertainty. According to Sherif, the implications of these findings are profound; they go to the very heart of how we understand human nature. If the most confident and persuasive people in a society value individual competition and personal gain, then "a person of the J. P. Morgan type will be among the great and envied heroes. In a society where the supreme values are the reverse, a person like Stakhanof will be hailed among the public heroes" (Sherif, 1966, p. 197). Strong political ideologues, by implication, are likely to be among the most persuasive and potentially divisive in society. In short, Sherif's research on the development of cultural norms strikes at the very nature of how people define themselves and what is considered ethical.

Sherif later became interested in understanding conflict among groups within a society after observing the problems he saw with race relations in the United States and elsewhere. Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, and Sherif (1961) reconfirmed the general notion that individual attitudes can be manipulated powerfully via group pressure but also found that competition induced stereotyping, prejudice, and violence toward outgroup members. At Robber's Cave, Sherif divided groups of boys at a camp into the "Eagles" and "Rattlers" and put the groups first into competition and then into a situation that required cooperation (i.e., a superordinate goal). Results revealed that competition encouraged violence toward and stereotyping of outgroups. These behaviors later stopped when the groups worked together toward a superordinate or shared goal. For Sherif, this mimicked the kind of competition one expects between individuals and groups versus the need for nations to work together. He also believed that his findings reflected how conflict between national subgroups can flare up under normal circumstances and disappear during periods of national crisis (Sherif et al., 1961). These research findings and implications inspired a generation of social psychologists to study how to avoid the hatred and violence created by intergroup competition (e.g., Aronson, Blaney, Stephan, Sikes, & Snapp, 1978; Brewer & Miller, 1984; Cook, 1985; Wilder, 1984, 1986).

Sherif was by no means alone in his interest in the ethics of employing group power. Asch (1955, 1956) also was interested in the power of the group to change public attitudes, as a result of having witnessed the rise of fascism in Europe. He initially believed that people would say what they believed to be true if the subject of discussion were objectively true (i.e., the witnessed behavior of someone else, or in the case of his later studies, the comparative length of lines). The results of his classic conformity experiments showed that Asch's initial hypothesis was wrong. Seventy-five percent of participants in his studies conformed at some point in the experiment when faced with a unanimous and incorrect majority. Although Sherif (1936) had demonstrated that group pressure could change attitudes in ambiguous situations, Asch's (1955) results demonstrated that people were willing to alter their public position on a task with an objective reality. Of course, participants did not necessarily believe the incorrect answers they gave. The powerful point Asch made is that most people are willing to publicly state something that they know to be objectively false. The ethical implication of these findings, according to Asch, is that an authority figure can entice people to make a false statement, in turn pressuring others into acting on that false statement. As Adolf Hitler (1938/1971) noted, "The great masses of the people will more easily fall victims to a big lie than to a small one" (p. 22).

Even more, there is evidence that these group membership processes work for good as well as evil in two other classic social psychology studies. The first example is in Lewin's (1943) use of this tactic to get women to prepare more organ meats during World War II. Neither rational nor emotional appeals persuaded women to change their behavior. Public discussion and commitment to each other following an appeal did, however. The women in the public commitment condition reported cooking more organ meat in the follow-up interview than any other condition. Similarly, Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter (1956) found such dynamics at work in their observational study of Marian Keech's "seekers" cult. They infiltrated the cult to find out how a cult leader maintains control when his or her "big lie" or prophecy fails. In this case, Marian Keech had predicted that the world would flood, but the few faithful would be saved. When the flooding failed to materialize, cult members who had the social support of other believers not only continued to profess belief in the prophecy but began to recruit new members to the cult based on the belief (i.e., caused by cognitive dissonance) that their faith had saved the earth. On the other hand, cult members who found themselves isolated without the social support of other members began to question their beliefs.

Tajfel's (1978, 1982) minimal group studies also show the power of group membership to create unethical behavior. In his effort to understand why intergroup hostility maintains itself over generations, Tajfel attempted to create the most "minimal" groups possible. His intention was to create a control condition for comparison with other groups based on more substantive criteria to better understand the foundations of intergroup hostility. His findings revolutionized the way social psychologists think about the power of group membership. Ingroup favoritism was found even in groups where there was no basis for discrimination between ingroup and outgroup members (i.e., random selection to membership). The ethical implications of this finding are profound; ingroup favoritism and prejudice do not need any basis in history or intergroup conflict. Simple categorization of people invokes differentiated behavior. The psychological and ethical implications of this seminal work have been pursued by a number of social psychologists (e.g., Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Brewer, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987).

Group membership, in sum, is a powerful force that can be used to apply social influence. More specifically, the ethical concern running through these studies is the notion that social pressure can be used to influence others to (a) state something they would otherwise not have said (Sherif, 1936), (b) engage in behavior that they would not initiate on their own (Festinger et al., 1956), and even (c) say things they do not believe (Asch, 1955). All of these studies suggest that people are loathe to deviate from others, even when it involves evaluating objective stimuli. Schachter's (1951) classic study on opinion deviance suggests a possible reason why it is difficult for an individual to resist such group pressure. He found that deviants are disliked intensely and are subject to enormous scrutiny, followed by shunning if they fail to comply with the group. By implication then, groups wishing to be ethical ought never to allow extreme and/or overly confident people to sway their group and thus apply this kind of pressure to others. The extreme version of this recommendation is the notion that leaders or authority figures ought to be closely monitored, or even barred from emerging at all, for fear that they may use the power of group pressure to press an unethical agenda. That fear is illustrated in the next group of classic social psychology studies.

Ethics and Leadership in Small Groups

Lewin's (1935; Lewin, Lippitt, & White, 1939) work on small-group leadership is also a classic example of ethical interests motivating social influence research.

Having seen the rise of fascism and its effect on the scapegoating of Jews, Lewin became interested in the role of leadership style on the ethical behavior of followers. He asked whether experiencing "authoritarian," "democratic," or "laissez-faire" leadership makes it more or less likely that group members would scapegoat outgroups, rebel against authority, or engage in violent behavior. In these classic studies of leadership styles, Lewin compared leadership climates (social influence styles) of adults working with groups of 11-year-old boys. He found that if leaders simply told group members what to do, the authoritarian style, group members (a) engaged in varying types of rebellion (e.g., passive or active aggression toward others in the group, destroying their own work, and extreme dislike of the leader), (b) practiced scapegoating of both outgroups and marginal ingroup members, and (c) reported extreme displeasure with the work environment. Democratic leadership, including discussing all issues with the boys, led to virtually no acts of scapegoating, rebellion, or violence. In short, the ethical behavior of group members was better under democratic rather than authoritarian leadership.

Lewin's seminal studies inspired a half-century of research implicating authoritarian or directive leaders as the cause of a variety of ethical concerns ranging from suppression of minority dissent and scapegoating to excessive leader influence on group decisions. (e.g., Callaway, Marriott, & Esser, 1985; Esser & Lindoerfer, 1989; Flowers, 1977; Harper & Askling, 1980; Hirokawa & Pace, 1983; Janis, 1972, 1982; Leana, 1985; Maier, 1950, 1963; Maier & Solem, 1952; Moorhead & Montanari, 1986). A great deal of subsequent research consistently implicated directive leaders as the cause of unethical group decisions. Maier (1950; Maier & Solem, 1952), for example, found that authoritarian leadership that suppressed dissent was associated with minority ideas being systematically ignored and ultimately worse solutions to problems being found.

Irving Janis' (1972, 1982) groupthink theory also suggests that directive leadership causes unethical group behavior (these decisions are also often ill-conceived, but see Sims, 1992, for a full justification of the unethical label). Specifically, Janis argued that "a lack of tradition of impartial leadership" was an antecedent cause of groupthink that resulted in unethical group behavior such as "stereotypes of outgroups," "belief in the inherent morality of the group," and "direct pressure on dissenters" to conform (Janis, 1982, pp. 244). In each of the 21 case studies listed in Table 3.1, the authors found support for the notion that directive leadership is a prime cause of groupthink and specific unethical outcomes.

Experimental studies investigating the leader directiveness component of the groupthink hypothesis also support the notion that authoritarian leadership is a significant cause of unethical behavior. For example, Courtright (1978) found that imposition of a restricting set of directions by the experimenter (a leader substitute) resulted in significantly less discussion of alternatives, especially in highly cohesive groups. Flowers (1977) found a similar effect by manipulating group cohesiveness and leadership style. She found no effect for group cohesiveness but found that a "closed" (partial and directive) leadership style engendered lesser acceptance of minority ideas, leading to decreased use of available information and

TABLE 3.1

A List of Case Histories of Groupthink-Induced Disasters Where Directive Leadership Was Cited as a Cause

No.	*Author*	*Case*
1	Janis (1982)	Chamberlain cabinet's decision to appease Hitler and Nazi Germany
2	Janis (1982)	Truman cabinet's decision to cross the 38th parallel in the Korean conflict
3	Janis (1982)	Kennedy cabinet's decision to support and launch the invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs
4	Janis (1982)	Johnson cabinet's decision to escalate the Vietnam War
5	Janis (1982)	Admiral Kimmel's lack of readiness for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
6	Janis (1982)	Nixon cabinet's decision to engage in a cover-up of the break-in at the Watergate complex
7	Janis (1982) Smith (1985)	Carter administration's failed attempt to rescue hostages in Tehran
8	Janis (1982)	Ford administration's decision to attempt to rescue the crew of the Mayaguez
9	Janis (1985)	Ford Motor Company's decision to build the Edsel
10	Janis (1985)	Buffalo Mining Company's decision to ignore warnings about their dam bursting
11	't Hart (1990)	Irangate decision to support the rebels in Nicaragua
12	'T Hart (1990)	Failure to prevent the Nazi invasion of Holland
13	Kroon, 't Hart, Crouch, & van Kreveld (1991)	Variety of dutch government operations
14	Heller (1983)	Thatcher administration's conduct of the Falkland Islands War
15	Hensley & Griffen (1986)	Kent State University Board of Trustees' decision to build on site of shooting
16	Huseman & Driver (1979)	Small and large business groups
17	Manz & Sims (1982)	Groupthink in autonomous work groups
18	Sims (1992)	Beech-Nut's decision to sell "phony" apple juice
19	Sims (1992)	Fraud at E. F. Hutton
20	Sims (1992)	Salomon Brothers' illegal purchase of government securities
21	Metselaar & Verbeek	Dutch government's conduct of the West New Guinea Conflict

ultimately to fewer solutions being suggested than with an "open" leadership style. The closed leader in her study strongly advocates a position on the issue being considered and discourages discussion of alternative solutions. Open leaders give a position on the issue only after others have given theirs (impartiality) and encourage discussion of all potential solutions.

Nonexperimental studies also have implicated directive leadership as the cause of unethical group behavior. The results of a descriptive study by Hirokawa and Pace (1983) suggested that influential group members (especially leaders) can often get others to accept invalid "facts" and lead their groups to unethical and poor group decisions (cf. Sherif, 1936). Similar results were reported in a study by Harper and Askling (1980), who found that directive leadership often results in conflict and poor decision making. Similarly, Moorhead and Montanari (1986) found that directive leadership and insulation from dissent generally led to poor decision process with teams of business students in a competitive 3-month management simulation.

Tetlock, Peterson, McGuire, Chang, and Feld (1992) employed a *q*-sort analysis of historical case studies to assess the internal logic of the groupthink model. They tested antecedent causal claims made by the groupthink model by using structural equation modeling across all eight of the groups Janis (1982) studied, plus two additional cases suggested as possible examples of groupthink. Consistent with other studies already discussed here, results revealed that structural and procedural faults of the organization, not group cohesiveness or situational stressors, were potent predictors of group process among the 10 political decision-making groups. Leader directiveness specifically was associated with truncated group discussion, suppression of dissent, a less extensive search for information, and a lack of contingency planning. Leader directiveness was found to be a significant cause of defective group process leading to a high likelihood of poor, often unethical, group decisions. In sum, research consistently supports the notion that directive leadership leads to unethical group member behaviors and poor quality group decisions.

Ethics and Obedience/Compliance With Authority

A third classic line of social influence inquiry that was motivated by ethical concerns is the literature on obedience to authority. Stanley Milgram (1963) was concerned with the capacity of everyday people to engage in unethical behavior they would never initiate on their own—all in the service of obedience to someone in a position of authority. He became interested in the subject as result of the Nuremberg trials, where German citizens defended their participation in the Holocaust by arguing that they were simply following others' orders. Milgram (1974) explicitly argued that Nazi Germany was not the exception but an extreme example of the general rule that people will engage in unethical behavior when ordered. He also cited the actions of soldiers in the Vietnam War as further examples of the continuing ethical problem of obedience to authority. Indeed, his studies documented the willingness of people in a democratic society (i.e., the United States) to follow unethical orders to administer extreme electric shock to an innocent victim.

The ethical problems associated with obedience to authority in Vietnam were powerfully described and studied in Herbert Kelman and V. Lee Hamilton's (1989) *Crimes of Obedience*. Specifically, they were interested in public response to the trial of Lieutenant Calley for giving orders in the My Lai massacre of civilians in Vietnam. Kelman and Hamilton found evidence to suggest that most people could imagine themselves engaging in criminal behavior if ordered to do so by a "legitimate" authority. The best way to avoid this ethical dilemma is, of course, to be sure that officers do not put soldiers in this kind of predicament, or more generally, to ensure that authority figures never request "nonnormative" (i.e., unethical) behavior from followers.

Standing the obedience literature on its head, procedural justice researchers more recently have looked for unethical behavior in disobedience to authority. Procedural justice researchers ask why people sometimes do not comply with the directives of legitimate authorities (i.e., police, judges, etc.) rather than why people do comply with the unethical directives of authorities. In other words, the concern is about engaging in unethical or antisocial behavior as a result of disobedience rather than obedience. Tyler and Lind (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind 1992) suggested that authorities must treat people with respect to gain legitimacy and compliance. In a study of citizen interaction with the Chicago police force, for example, Tyler (1990) found that people obey the law voluntarily (a) when laws are made and enforced by impartial authorities, (b) when laws are enacted in procedurally fair ways, and (c) when the police force treats people with respect. Together, these two literatures on compliance or obedience to authority (which one you chose depends on your perspective) suggest opposing sources of unethical behavior (obedience vs. disobedience). However, they agree that ethical or "fair" authority is content neutral. Either an authority should refrain from encouraging people to engage in unethical acts (i.e., the obedience paradigm) or the authority should enforce rules in a neutral manner (i.e., the procedural justice paradigm).

EXERCISING SOCIAL INFLUENCE ETHICALLY

As diverse as the social influence literature is, it shares two interrelated ideas. The first is the focus of attention on the direct exercise of social influence. In other words, these studies all focus on the use of persuasion or threat aimed at changing the public attitudes and behaviors of the less powerful. The second and related commonality in the literatures is the call for restraint in exercising social influence as the most ethical course of action. Milgram (1974), for example, recommended that authorities not demand "nonnormative behavior." He argued that it is unethical to ask someone to do something out of the everyday norm. Similarly, Festinger et al. (1956) suggested that cults are the product of a charismatic individual without whom cults and their potentially unethical behavior would not exist. Lind and Tyler (1988) likewise argued that fair procedures require "neutral" authorities. If an authority favors one position over another before hearing from both sides, one cannot expect full compliance with the directives of the authority. In group decision making, Janis (1982; Janis & Mann, 1978, 1989) argued that leaders should set broad parameters and limitations but refrain from advocating specific actions or decisions. He argued strongly that leaders ought to refrain from communicating policy preferences to achieve an atmosphere of open communication and problem solving. Expressing a clear policy preference, he argued, discourages the group from seriously examining all aspects of a problem and is likely to lead to disastrous, often unethical, outcomes. In sum, the consensus view on ethics and social influence appears to be that powerful people ought not to exert direct influence to be ethical in their use of power—they should stick with indirect forms of control such as facilitating decision making.

Is Refraining From Direct Social Influence Attempts the Best Advice We Can Offer?

Does the existing advice to refrain from engaging in direct social influence attempts fully address all of the ethical issues inherent in the exercise of social influence? Is it reasonable and advisable to expect powerful people to refrain from engaging in social influence attempts? Two strands of work suggest an alternative point of view. First, recent findings in the procedural justice literature strongly suggest that people care deeply about being treated with respect (e.g., Tyler & Lind, 1992). People care about how they are treated by authority figures because that treatment conveys to them that they are valued socially. This effect is so strong, in fact, that it can be found even after controlling for any effect that procedure has on perceptions of control over the outcome of the decision (e.g., Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1993). In other words, people derive self-esteem from respectful treatment, not control over the process as a means to obtain a favorable outcome.[1]

The second strand of work that questions the advice for influential people to refrain from direct social influence is my own more specific work on process and outcome directiveness. Recently, I have argued that the negative effects associated with directive leadership reviewed earlier actually result from process directiveness (i.e., the regulation of the process by which the group reaches a decision) rather than outcome directiveness (i.e., the degree to which a leader advocates a favored solution; Peterson, 1997; Peterson, Owens, Tetlock, Fan, & Martorana, 1997). The problem with directive leadership as it has been studied in the past is not promotion of the leader's own point of view as much as if the leader genuinely encourages additional perspectives through the process of decision making. Past studies of leader directiveness have confounded "process" and "outcome" directiveness. Those studies have operationalized leader directiveness by

[1]Thibaut and Walker (1975) originally suggested that people cared about procedural justice and treatment by authority figures because these concepts allowed for indirect control over the outcome of the decision.

manipulating whether the leader strongly advocates a specific position and whether the leader encourages discussion of all possible alternatives. "Open" or "democratic" leaders do not advocate a position of their own (low outcome directiveness), but they do encourage discussion of alternative ideas (high process directiveness). "Closed" or "authoritarian" leaders are the reciprocal, strongly advocating their own solution (high outcome directiveness and low process directiveness). That study (Peterson, 1997) tested the hypothesis that process directiveness would be a potent predictor of group process and decision quality, whereas outcome directiveness would not. Results of studies from an experiment, archival analysis of the case histories Janis studied, and an observational study of city councils in the San Francisco Bay Area all confirmed this prediction.

In a more recent study of seven top management teams of seven large companies in successful and unsuccessful times, Peterson, Owens, Tetlock, Fan, and Martorana (1998) found compatible results. We found that successful decision-making teams had strong leaders who were more likely to try to persuade others in the corporation to share their views than were leaders of unsuccessful teams. Moreover, leaders of successful teams were more likely to be explicit about their policy preferences with others. This finding clearly contradicts the advocates of impartiality. Importantly, however, successful chief executive officers were also more open to minority dissent than their unsuccessful counterparts. This combination of findings is consistent with my argument here that people respond as strongly to how they are treated by authority figures as much as to the specific outcomes that come from a decision-making process. In short, process behaviors of leaders are significant and reliable predictors of group member satisfaction, acceptance of minority rights, and acknowledgment of trade-offs in the decision making of presidential cabinets, city councils, top management teams, and experimental subjects.

The message of this larger pattern of results is, in short, that influential people concerned about their ethical impact on an organization should focus on the process by which decisions are made as much as on the actual decisions themselves (a more deontological or process-oriented approach). These results suggest that people care deeply about indirect social influence attempts as well as the direct attempts. That is, people care deeply about how they are treated by people in positions of authority (cf. Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992).[2]

Toward a More Deontological Approach to Research on the Ethical Use of Social Influence

The call for more attention to process and indirect social influence attempts raises three interrelated research problems. The first and most thorny of the problems is defining what an ethical or fair process entails. From a social science perspective,

[2]In many respects this was a lost point from Lewin et al. (1939), who argued that the decision-making climate matters more than specific orders that followers are given (i.e., process matters more than outcome).

this presents a formidable challenge because people's perceptions of what constitutes a fair process are affected by their personal values (Feather, 1994, 1996; Peterson, 1994; Rasinski, 1987). For guidance on the question of implied social values (i.e., ethical norms), one can turn to a variety of normatively important historical and philosophical treatises such as Aristotle's *Politics*, Hamilton, Madison, and Jay's *The Federalist,* Mill's *Essay on Liberty,* and the *United States Constitution*. All of these documents emphasize the importance of protecting minority rights and engaging dissent directly and genuinely. This is not to say that the majority ought to be prohibited from acting without the consent of the minority, just that dissent ought to be honestly engaged. How it is to be engaged is a more difficult problem, however (e.g., Jost & Ross, 1999).

The difficulty of defining fair process notwithstanding, scholars interested in procedural justice have made significant attempts to address this problem. Early theoretical work was done by Leventhal (1980), who suggested six rules of justice, consistency (across people and over time), bias suppression (i.e., no self-interest on the part of authorities), accuracy (use of accurate information), correctability (opportunities to modify the actions of a single individual), representativeness (concerns considered), and ethicality (compatibility with social values). Tyler and Lind (1992) found empirical support for their three-part model of neutrality, standing (the degree to which the authority treats others with respect and dignity), and trust (the degree to which the authority tries to account for the individual needs of others) as the key aspects of fair process. Belliveau (1995) also pointed to social identity issues as being a significant predictor of what constitutes fair process. Specifically, she argued that universalistic standards of interpersonal treatment determine perceptions of procedural fairness. All three of these perspectives offer important beginnings to understanding what constitutes fair process, but clearly more work needs to be done.

Progress in defining fair process also would be aided by work describing how influential people engage in indirect social influence attempts and the effects of these tactics on followers. Here again, there is some significant beginning work in the area. Hoyt and Garrison (1997), for example, suggested three ways in which leaders can indirectly influence decisions. The first is structural manipulation—this involves changing the physical composition of the deliberating group. Highly influential people often have the power to determine who will be included in any decision-making process. Unethical leaders can handpick their group to favor the outcome they desire or systematically exclude an individual or perspective. They usually also have the power to add others midway through the process if they realize they could be defeated by the existing configuration of people.

Influential people also have the power to change discussion through agenda setting, framing, and control of information. Leaders have enormous impact on the direction of the group by what they declare off-limits or priority. A carefully crafted set of parameters virtually can predetermine the outcome of a meeting. People also may choose to influence others by deciding what information to disclose or hide from others. All of this can be done while staying within Janis' (1982) directive to leaders to restrict themselves to setting broad parameters and limitations for decisions.

Finally, indirect influence also can occur through interpersonal manipulation. That is, influential people often are able to shape the dynamics between individuals (e.g., playing one person against another). They may use threats to discourage dissent. They may also use the coalition-building process in groups to their advantage (e.g., let others fight their battles for them). Influential people also may be in a position to either choose their own "expert" or designate someone in the group as a technical expert not to be questioned on some important matter. All of these tactics have been demonstrated in the cabinets of Presidents Nixon and Carter (see Garrison, 1996). However, more work needs to be done to fully understand the effects of these tactics on the ethical behavior of other team members.

A third research issue for a deontological perspective on the ethical use of social influence derives from the second, that is, influential people who act or "look" fair and inclusive but are not. Greenberg (1990), in particular, suggested that the notion of impression management vis-à-vis "fairness" is understudied. He suggested that "looking fair" is a highly desirable social identity that people seek to achieve.[3] In fact, Belliveau and Cook (1999) further suggest that when given the opportunity to appear procedurally fair, managers and leaders may actually behave less fairly. That is, they may behave in a distributively unfair way where otherwise, in the absence of an opportunity to demonstrate their procedural fairness, they would have acted with distributive fairness. Leaders need not necessarily actually be fair. As Machiavelli (1531/1979) noted in *The Discourses,* "The people are often deceived by a false appearance of good unless they are persuaded otherwise by someone worthy of their confidence" (p. 274). Indeed, as Brockner, Tyler, and Cooper-Schneider (1992) discovered, when loyal people discover that they have been deceived by someone in a position of authority, they react extremely negatively. That is not to say that trying to be perceived as fair is itself inherently unethical. Even those who strive to be ethical and fair usually need others to see them as fair if they are to be effective. The important point is that leaders can give "window dressing" to fair procedure but actually work toward unethical ends. We know very little about how this occurs in the real world and what its effects are.

CONCLUSION

In sum, I make two interrelated arguments in this chapter. First, I argue that the recommendation to restrict the use of direct social influence by the powerful does not solve the ethical dilemmas associated with the exercise of social influence. Such recommendations for impartiality, neutrality, and normative behavior simply pass the dilemmas to more indirect forms of social influence. Influential people are able to manipulate others indirectly as well as directly if they choose.

[3]Indeed, this is one important reason that authoritarian political regimes engage in periodic "elections" with no choice: Such elections enhance the notion that the dictatorship is legitimate.

The second argument I make here is that the study of the ethics of social influence would be greatly enhanced and enriched by directing more attention to indirect forms of social influence. To that end, I have suggested a research agenda that includes defining fair process (cf. Tyler & Lind, 1992), explicating how influential people use indirect tactics of social influence (cf. Hoyt & Garrison, 1997), and studying impression management tactics in authority relations (cf. Greenberg, 1990). Each of these areas has important early work already underway. However, many important things are yet to be learned about what people believe about fair process, how influential people manipulate process to personal advantage, and the impression management process.

One note of clarification should be made. I am not arguing that direct attempts at social influence do not pose ethical problems. Most of the literature reviewed here and in the other chapters in this volume speak to the importance of these problems. Rather, I am arguing for the need to consider the social science implications of the following argument (Perrault, 1990): "In actuality, the means that we use do shape who we are. We cannot separate the means from the end ... we become whatever we do." (p. 2)

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